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280 RoBBK tI. CoUNTY OF ORANGE [32 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 201n. ID Bank. July 30, 1948.) 
E. L. ROEHM, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE et aI., 
Respondents. 
[1] 'l'axation-Personal Property-Intangible Property.-Const., 
art. XTII, § ]4, granting power to provide for taxation of in-
tangible property listed therein, by implication excludes the 
item!! not specified. 
[2] ld.-Personal Property-Intangible Property.-Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 111, defining "intangibles" and "intangible personal 
property." confines the meaning of intangible personal property 
to the intangibles listed, and makes immune from taxation all 
intangibles not included in the statutory definition. 
[8] ld.-Personal Property-Intangible Property.-The constitu-
tional and statutory provisions relating to the taxation of 
franchises are not applicabl~ to liquor licenses. 
[4] Id.-Personal Property-Intangible Property.-The only in-
tangibles (except franchises, which are in a class by them-
selves) subject to taxation are solvent credits (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, §§ 1059, 2153). All other types of intangible assets speci-
fied in Const., art. XIII, § 14, as amended, and Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 111, are exempted from taxation by section 212 of that 
code. 
[5] ld. - Personal Property - Intangible Property. - Liquor li-
censes are not subject to ad valorem taxation as personal prop-
erty, since they are not included in the list of intangibles speci-
fied in Const., art. XIII, § 14, as amended, and Rev. & TaL 
Code, § 111. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
Count~·. Raymond Thompson, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgment of 
dismissal on sustaining demurrer to complaint, reversed. 
Head, Wellington & .Jacobs, Arthur M. Bradley and Otto 
A. Jarous for Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, J. Albert Hutchinson, 
Deputy Attorney General, Irwin M. Fulop, Landon MorriR, 
[1 J ~1'1':24 Ca1.Jur. SO; 5] Ant.Jur . .j~ 1. 
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Albert E. Isenberg, Holbrook & Tarr and W. Sumner Hol-
brook, Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Joe Ogle, County Counsl'l, George F. Holden, Royal E. 
Hubbard, Deputy County Counsel, and Jolm K. Colwell, City 
Attorney (Santa Ana), for Respondents. 
Harold W. Kl'nnedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and 
Loton Wells, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The County Assessor of Orange County 
in 1946 assessed as personal property plaintift's on-sale 
general liquor license issued by the State Board of Equal-
ization. Ad valorem county and city property taxes levied 
thereon in the sum of $432.62 were paid by plaintiff under 
protest, and he brought this action to recover them. He ap-
peals from a judgment dismissing his action upon the sus-
taining of a general demurrer to his complaint. 
PlaintitI contends that liquor licenses, like many other 
intangible assets, are not taxable. He asks that the court 
be mindful of the practice for almost a hundred years in 
this state not to levy property taxes on liquor licenses and 
other licenses or on many other intangible assets such as 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, judgments, causes of ac-
tion, the goodwill of businesses, insurance policies, stock ex-
change seats, press association memberships, and member-
ships in social, professional, and fraternal clubs. He con-
tends that this practice was based on the conviction of tax-
ing authorities as well as taxpayers that such intangibles 
are not property within the meaning of the constitutional 
and statutory provisions imposing a uniform property tax on 
all nonexempt property in the state, and that this convic-
tion 'Was sustained by this court in holding that the right 
to a stock exchange seat is "too impalpable to go into any 
category of taxable property." (San It'rancisco v. Anderson, 
103 Cal. 69, 70 [36 P. 1034, 42 Am.St.Rep. 98].) He also 
contends that section 1 of article XIII of the California Con-
stitution anu statutory provisions enacted pursuant thereto 
must be read, not alone, but in conjun(~tion with the various 
amelldments adopteuto the property tax provisions of the 
Constitution i that these amendments made substantial 
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the policy of ('liminaling altogpthl'r property taxation of all 
intangibles (~x<!('pt solwml credits and substituting therefor 
taxation of tht' ineome derived from snell intangibles j tllat 
in implementing this policy the Legislat me enacted the 
Personal Income Tax Act [Stats. 1935, p. 1O!l0 as amended; 
3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8494} and eliminated property 
taxation of intllngiblm; exc('pt for a minimal tax on solvent 
credits; and that in uny event counties and cities cannot 
impose property taxes on liquor licenses without encroach-
ing upon the exclusive power of the State Board of Equal-
ization under section 22 of article XX of the California 
Constitution to issue such licensE'S and to collect license fees 
and occupation tuxes on the manufacture and sale of liquor. 
Defendants contend on the other hand that a liquor li-
cense is property within the meaning of section 1 of article 
XIII of the California Constitution and sections 201 and 
103 of the Revenue and Taxation Code·, under which all 
property in this state must be uniformly taxed unless it is 
exempt from taxation and t.hat there is no exemption of 
liquor licenses; and that since the tax in question is a 
property tax and not an excise tax on an occupation, it does 
not encroach upon the exclusiye power of the State Board 
of Equalization under section 22 of article XX to issue liquor 
licenses or collect license fees and occupation taxes 011 the 
manufacture and sale of liquor. Defendants' reasoning is 
as follows: The attributes of property in a liquor license 
are the exclusive right granted by the state to a small group 
of licensees in each county to enjoy the benefits of the busi-
ness of engaging in the sale of distilled spirits alJd the 
transferability of the rIght by ordinary sale. Undl'r section 
38f of the act [Stats. 1945, ch. 1401; 2 Del'ring's Gell. Laws, 
Supp., Act 3796], licensees received valuable riglJts and 
privileges not available to others, since the number of general 
liqnor licenses is limited in proportion to the population in 
t'aeh of the counties of the state. Others who wish to enter 
the business can do so only by acquiring the privilege from 
une who has been previously licensed. Consequently, the 
license itself has become as valuable as the stock in trade 
or the other tangible nssets of a liquor estahlishment. Al-
though a liquor license is merely a privilege so far as the 
... All propt,rty in this ~Iah' 1101 c\('lllpt lIIul!'r tilt' laWN of till' Pnitt'd 
Stutes or of thiH Stat!', is slIhjc,('t to ta;,;ltion IIIUI<'T tld~ (·ode." (~!:!(ll.) 
" 'Property' incilldt's all matters lind tl, iugs, r('a I. personal, and mixed. 
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relations between the licensee and thc state are concerned, 
it is property in any relationship between the licensee and 
third persons, because t.he license has value and may ~ 
s:lld. (Doggender v. Seattle Brewing and Malting Co., 41 
Wash. 385 [83 P. 898, 4 L.R.A.N.S., 626, 628]; 148 A.L.R. 
492; Jaffe v. Pacific Brewing and ~A1alting Co., 69 Wash. 
308 [124 P. 1122].) A liquor license that is transferable has 
been held to be property subject to execution and attachment 
if local law provides a statutory procedure therefor (Rowe v. 
Colpoys, App. D.C., 137 F.2d 249, 148 A.L.R. 488, 492; In 
re Fuetl,247 F. 829,40 Am.Bank.Rep. 570; Sayers' Appeal, 
89 Conn. 315 [94 A. 358]), and under the Bankruptcy Act 
l30 8tats. 544, 11 U.S.C.A, § 1 et seq.] such a license is 
usually regarded as property that passes to the trustee in 
bankruptcy. (Fisher v. Cushman, 103 F. 860 l43 C.C.A. 
381. 51 L.R.A. 292].) These dpcisions recognize the prin-
ciple that since such a license has a transferable value to 
the debtor it is property that in fairness ought to be within 
the r('ach of his creditors. Since by statute a liquor license 
in this state bas in effect been given a transferable value, 
it has assumed the characteristics of property. If a system 
of ad valorem taxation is to reach all property in the com-
munity, tenuous distinctions should not be indulged in to 
exclude a liquor license from taxation. Virtually the same 
reasoning could be advaneed for the taxation of other forms 
of governmental permits, stock exchange seats, press asso-
ciation memberships, memberships in social,professioual, 
and fraternal clubs, patents, copyrights, goodwill, judg-
ments, causes of action, and insurance polil·ieli, which have 
newr been taxed as property in this state during' its entire 
existence. These contentions therefore raise questions of 
public importan(~e that involve numerous rights and privi-
leges other than liquor licenses, for the characteristics that 
it is claimed make liquor licenses taxable as property would 
likewise make numerous other rights and privileges taxable 
as property. 
Article XIII of thp California Constitution as first 
adopted proyid('d for a uniform property tax upon real and 
personal property alike. This requirement of uniform tax-
ation of real and p\'l'l'ollal prOpl~l'ty, however, has been 
abandoned by subsequent amendments. nnder these amend-
O1£'lItl' the J~egisJatnre IlIU)' dassify ppl'sonal property for 




284 RoEHM V. COUN'fY OF ORANGE [32 C.2rl 
81lY form, type, or class thereof. In the light of these 
amendments and the legislation pursuant thereto, it is un-
necessary to determine whether liquor licenses and other 
intangibl(' rights and privileges, which under settled prac-
tice were not taxed as property when the Constitution made 
uniform taxation of all property in tht' stntl' mandatory, 
should have been taxed. The controlling- question is whether 
under present constitutional and statutory provisions sucb 
licenses can now bt' regarded as personal property for the 
purposes of taxation. 
The constitutional amendments relating to the taxation 
of personal property, particularly intangibles, as adopted 
in 1933 as part of section 14 of articlr XIII, read in part 
as follows: "The Legislature shall bave the power to pro-
vidl' for the assessment, levy and eollection of taxes upon all 
forms of tangible personal property, all notes, debentures, 
shares of capital stock, bonds, solyent credits, deeds of trust, 
mortgages, and any legal or equitable interest therein, not 
exempt from taxation under the provisions of this Constitu-
tion, in such manner, and at such rates, as may b(' provided 
by law, and in pursuance of the exercise of such power tbe 
I.Jcgislature, two-thirds of all of the members elected to each 
of the two houses voting in favor thereof, may classify any 
and all kinds of personal property for the purposes of as-
sessment and taxation in a manner and at a rate or rates in 
proportion to value different from any other property in 
this State subject to taxation and may exempt entirely from 
taxation any or all forms, types or classes of personal 
property. 
"Thr total tax imposed on notes, debentures, shares of 
capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, mort-
gages, anll any legal or equitable interest therein in pur-
suance of the provisions of this section shall not be at a 
rate in excess of four-tenths of one per cent of the actual 
valne of such property and no tax burden shall be imposed 
upon any personal proprrty eithrr tangible or intangible 
which shall exceed the tax bllrden on real property in the 
sallll' taxin~ jurisdidion in proportion to the actual value 
of sneh property." 
[1] '1'hc distinction in the first clause of this amendment 
bet wet'n "all forms of tangible perliollal property" and "all 
noh's, debeutures, shares of capital stock, bouds, solvent 
credits, deeds of trust, mortgages, and any legal or equitable 
/ 
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inter!'s! thrr('in" and the reference in the second clause to 
"any alld all kinJs of personal properly" and to "any and 
all forllls, types, or (·lasses of perlSonal property" indicate 
that the framers of tlit' amendment, followine the practice 
estAblished for generations and sustained by this court in 
San Pt'ancisco v. Anderson, 103 Cal. 69, 70 [36 p, 1034, 
42 Am.St.Rep. 98], were of ·the view that the intangibles 
listed covered all the forms of taxable intAngible property, just 
as the phrase .. all forms of tangible personal property" cov-
I'rl'd all forms of such property, The first dausc is :1 grant 
of power to the Legislature to provide for the assessment, 
le"y, and collection of taxes, but it does not grant power to 
provide for the taxation of intangible asscts other than those 
listed. Moreover, it cannot reasonably be assumed that the 
provision authorizing classifications and exemptions, which 
is all inclusive, was intended to be broader in scope than 
the provision granting power to provide for assessment, levy, 
and collection, for it is in "pursuance of the exercise of such 
power" that the classifications and exemptions may be 
made, 
[2] What appears from the constitutional provisions by 
clear implication is expressly stated in section 111 of the 
Re\'(~nuf' and Taxation Code, which defines intangibles and 
intangible perl>onal property for purposes of taxation: 
., • Intanp-ibles means intangible personal property of a 
type not eXl'llIpt from taxation and any interest therein. 
'Intangible perlSollal property' means only notes, debentures, 
shares of capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, 
and mortgages." (Italics added,) It is clear that it is the 
iJurpose of sc(,tion 111 to confine the meaning of intangible 
personal property to the intangibles listed, not to establish 
the· fiction t.hat illtan~ib]e assets other than those therein 
specifieil are tangible personal property. Emanating from 
a Legislature vested with the power to exempt from taxation 
all kinds of persollal property, it makes immunc from tax-
ation all intangibles not included in the statutory definition, 
llltangible ,"alues, however, that eannot be separately taxed 
as property may be reflected in the valuation of taxable 
property, Thus, in determining the value of property, as-
sessillg authurities may take into consideration earnings 
deriH'd t1~rdrom, which muy depend upon the possession 
of illtaugible rights and privileges that are not themselves 
regarded as a separate class of taxable propert.y. (Los Ange-
/ 
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les etc. Co. v. Los Angeles County~ 162 Cal. 164 l121 P. 384] ; 
Eastern-Columbia, Inc. v. County of Los AngeLes, 61 Cal. 
App.2d 734, 745 [143 P.2d 992J ; Btr'ck v. County of Orange, 
59 Cal.App. 133, 136, 138 [210 P. 57 j ; Ewert v. 7'aylor, a8 
S. D. 124 [160 N.W. 797]; South Utalt Mines ~ Smelters v. 
Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325, 330 l43 S.Ct. 577, 67 L.Ed. 
1004] ; Stein v. Mobt"le, 17 Ala. 234; see 3 Cooley, Taxation 
(4th ed.), § 1145; 51 Am.Jur. 649.) 
It should be noted that franchises are not governed by 
the foregoing provisions of section 14 of article Xln of the 
California Constitution or of section III of the Hevenue and 
'I'nation Code. They are made a separate subject of tax-
ation by section 16 of article XIII: "The Legislature may 
pro\'ide by law for the taxation of corporations, their fran-
chises, or any other franchises, by any method not prohibited 
by this Constitution or the Constitution or laws of the United 
States." Franchises have long been regarded in this state 
as a elass of property separate from all other classes of prop-
erty. (San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614; Spring 
Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69; Stockton 
Gas & Electric Co. v. San Joaquin County, 148 Cal. 313 
l83 P. 54, 7 Ann.Cas. 511, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 174]; Kern River 
Co. v. Los Angeles County. 164 Cal. 751 l130 P. 714]; 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hopkins, ]60 Cal. 106 [116 
P. 557] ; Postal-Telegraplt Cable Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 
164 Cal. 156 [128 P. 19].) The tax imposed by the Bank 
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act (Stats. 1929, p. 19, as 
amended; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8488) on corporations 
for the privilege of exercising their corporate franchises in 
this state accord~ng to or measured by their net income is 
"in lieu of all ad "alorem taxes and assessments of every 
kind and nature upon the general eorporate franchises of 
the corporations taxable her~under but shall not be in lieu 
of any ta.~es or assessments upon the special franchises 
owned, held or used by said corporations. All such special 
franchises shall be assessed annually by the State Board of 
Equalization (at their actual nlue) in the same manner as 
. is provided for the assessment of other property to be as-
sessed by said board under Section 14 of Article XIII of 
the Constitution of this Statc, and shan be subject to tax-
ation to the same extent and in the same manner as other 
property so assclSsed by said board." ( § 4 (7).) 
[3] The constitutional and statutory provisions relat-
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ever, to liquor licenses and have never been applied to such 
licenses, for under the decision of this court in Spring Valley 
Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 107, licenses to en-
gage in business activities are not franchises for purposes 
of taxation. 
The construction of section 14 of article XIII of 
the California Constitutioll and section 111 of the Revenue 
and Taxation Code as specifying the intangible assets (ex-
cept franchises, for which specific provision is made else-
where) that are subject to property taxation is clearly 
supported by the considerations of policy underlying the 
amendments to the Constitution and the legislation pursuant 
thereto. 1 t has long been recognized that cOllcealment of 
intangible a..,sets inescapably follows from the imposition of 
high property taxes thereon, and that the question of releas-
ing intangibles from property taxation or reducing tax rates 
involves a consideratioll of all intangibles. (Seligman, Es-
says in Taxation (10th ed.), pp. 17-32, 61-62; ibid. 641-659 
[Reprint of Presidential Address at the Ninth Ann. Conf. 
of the Nat. Tax. Assn. San Francisco, Aug. 11, 1915); Le-
land, The Classified Property 'l'ax in the United States. 
27-30, 117-130; 178-221; 401-419; Jensell, Property Taxaticn 
in the United States, 54-56. 172-203; J ames, Taxation of 
Intangibles, 58 Anllals of the Amer. Acad. for Pol. and Soc. 
Science, 95-104.) In determining the validity of a statute con-
cerning taxation of intangibles enacted under the 1924 
amendments to section 121/2 of article X~II of the California. 
Constitution, this court declared in Arnold v. Hopkins, 203 
Cal. 553, 559 [265 P. 223]: " ... [E]xperiencc had shown 
that whatever the difficulties, obstacles and inequalities en-
countered by tax offirials in the assessment, levy, and col-
lection of taxes UPOll property in proportion to its value, 
these were accentuated in the endeavor of these officials to 
discover and adequately subject to taxation certain kinds 
of personal property whi<:h, from its nature, was susceptible 
of being sequestered and ('oncealed by the owners thereof 
with a view to eS('aping t.axatioll, or which the assessable 
value, also from the nature 1 hl'reof, was difficult of ascer-
tainment. These forms of elusive prolwrty were, generally 
spell-king, notes, solvent credits, bonds, delll'ntures, shares 
of stock and like properties so]))rtill1l's eharUI·terized as 'in-
tangihh·s.' Of reeent years the amount and variety of forms 
of these sO-I·alled intangible properties has vastly increased 
/ 
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wil." th,' r,·slIlt. lJlat th(' Poxt,,"t. to which propert.ips of the 
furl'going dnssl's wcrr I'ith(·r ('\,Rding taxation or, when 
!{Iuntl, w('re b('ing subj(,(·t('(J to in(>rtlinutl' and unjust. bur-
dl'ns had IP'own t.o Ill' a real evil in the structure and opera-
tion of (lur stRte laws affecting and providing for local 
taxation. it walol precisely this e"il which required remedial 
I<'gis)atioll, but it was an evil wbi(!h legislation could not 
fully reach and remedy without a change in tbe state con· 
stitutioll, and in those provisions tbereof . . . which pro-
. vided for tbe uniform taxation of all property in proportion 
to its value." 
Similarly, the California 'fax Oommission, under a man-
date from the Legislature to investigate and report on mat-
h'rs of revenue and taxation (StatK.1927, ch. 4(5), was 
guided in its proposal concerning taxation of intangibles by 
Ihe expl!rience demonstrating that iutangible personal prop-
erty should be taxed differently from all other kinds of prop-
erty as a whole. In its report to the governor on August 10, 
1928, tbe commission proposeJ that the intangibles that were 
Imbl'lcqucntly specified in section 14 of article XIII of the 
Constitution should be subject to no higher tax rates than 
four-tenths of one per cent on their actual values. This pro-
pl»:iAI was adopted in the 1933 amendments to section 14 of 
article XIII. The report (p. 50) designated the proposal of 
the cOlUmission as a" Proposed Plan For The Taxation of 
lntnngibles. " 'I'he necessity for aconstitutiollal provision with 
respect to th,' taxation of intan~ibles is explained ill detail. 
"The CQlumil>siun is convinced that the taxation of sllch 
property at fuU valuation and at the full ratt> is an admin-
istrative impOl:iSibility and an ethical monstrosity. To extend 
!'peeial treatlUt'nt to such property is, in its opinion, a prac-
tical neccSliity." The fact that the proposal of the commission, 
incorporated into the Constitution in 1933, was concerned 
with all intangible personal property appears not only from 
the heading of the proposal in the report and tile considera-
tions set forth therein, but with particular clarity from table 
XIII in the report, which showed the methods of ., Taxation 
of lntang-iblcs in Certain States." 'fhe information included 
in this table is given under such column beadings as ,. Intan-
gibles subject to special rate," "Intallgiblps Exempt from 
Ad Valorem Tax," "Substitute for Ad Valorem Tax on In-
tangibles." By comparing its proposed maximum rate with 
the taxation of all kinds of intangibles, the commission made 
./ 
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it clear beyonu possibility ()f (1011111 that its proposal was 
dirC'cf\',1 at 1111 intal1~ihll's ImbjC'('f to property taxation. 
[4] TIl(' only iJltangibles (CX(~('pt frallchil>es, which al'e 
in a class by thelllsl'l\'cs) subject to taxation under the present 
system of property taxation in this state are solvent credits. 
which arc taxed at the minimal rate of one per mill on thpir 
actual value. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 1059, 2153.) All other 
types of intangible assets specified in section 14 of article 
XIII of the Constitution, as amended, and section 111 of the 
Revenue and 'faxstion Code are exempted from taxation by 
section 212 of that code and are therefore not part of the 
taxable personal property in this state. This system of taxa-
tion is supplemented, however, by taxes imposed upon or 
measured by net income including income derived from all 
kinds of intangible rights and privileges. Such taxes were 
regarded by the Legislature and the framers of the constitu-
tional amendments to article XIII of the California Constitu-
tion as a sufficient burden on the benefits derived from the 
ownership of such rights and privileges. 
Acting under the authority of section 14 of article 
XIII of the Constitution, as amended, the Legislature pro-
vided that the intangibles specified in section 14, except solvent 
credits, were no longer taxable "if and when a net income 
tax shall he passed or adopted in this State." Section 362780 
of the Political Code, as amended, also provided: "Upon the 
passage or ~Hlopti()n of such tax and from the time such in-
come tnx bl'l'CllufS elfcetive such net income tax shall be in 
lieu of the tax hl'rl'iJl provided for upon notes. debentures, 
shares of capital stod,. bonds, deeds of trust, mortgages and 
any legal or eqnitahk interest thl'rein. Provided, however, 
that any anl1 all taxes impost',l berdn on such property prior 
to the passage or adoptioll of such net income tax and the 
effective date thereof shall remain fully collectible and dis-
tributable hereunder." (Sec Pacific Co. v. Board of Super-
visors,8 Ca1.2d 611 [67 P.2d 3351; Weber v. County of Santa 
Barbara, 15 Ca1.2d 82, 85 [98 P.2d 492].) The same amend-
ment to section 3627a of the Political Code reduced the rate on 
solvent credits to one-tenth of 1 per cent. It cannot reason-
ably be assumed that the Legislature intended to replace by 
income taxq!,ion all property taxes on intangible assets there-
tofore taxed, but to impose 011 taxpayers whose intangible 
rights and privileges were t.hl'retofore not considered taxable 
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erty taxes at ordinary rates. A mong the absurdities that 
would ensue from such proprrty taxation would be the taxa-
tion of life insurance polici('s at ratt's ex(·t'eding in some in-
stances 4 or 5 per cent of the value of such policies. Intangible 
assets are often interchangeable so that exemption of some and 
taxation of others at high rates would induce taxpayers to 
convert highly taxable intangibles into tax-free intan~ihlt>s 
or to conceal them. Thus, subjection of patents or copyrights 
to such taxes would lead to the transfer of such rights to for-
eign corporations in exchange for corporate stock specifically 
exempted from property taxation by section 212 of the Reve-
nue and Taxation Code. 
It follows from the foregoing construction of the 1933 amend-
ments to the Constitution and section 111 of the Revcnllt' and 
Taxation Code that only tht> intangibles therein specified are 
to be regarded as personal property for purposes of taxation. 
[5] Liquor licenses as well as other intangible values not in-
(·Iuded in the list of intangibles spccifil>d in that constitutional 
provision and in section 11] are t.herefore not subject to ad 
valorem taxation as personal property. 
Although liquor licellst>s are 1Iot taxable as property 
and the licensees are not subject to local Iiecnse or occnpation 
taxes for the selling of iutoxicatillg li4110r (Cal. Const., art. 
XX, § 22; Los Angeles Brewing Co. v. Los Angdes, 8 Cal. 
App.2d 391 [48 P.2d 71]), ('itics, conntil:'R, and cities Ilnd conn-
ties receive substantial rcvenue from the fees imposed for such 
lieenst>s. Seetion 22 of article XX of fht> California Constitu-
tion, in recognition of the fact that the centralbmtioll in the 
statt> government of liqnor control and the collpctioll of licenRe 
fees and occupation taxps from liqnor Ikrnsees wonld deprive 
local subdivisions of the state of a pot('ntinl sonrce of revenue, 
provides: "The Legi~lature shall provhlt> for apportioning 
the amounts collected for lic('nse fees or oe('npation taxes 
under the provisions hen'of bi·tween thp Statr find the cities, 
counties and citit>s and COllllties of the State in SI1<'h mannt>r 
as t.ht> Legislature lIlay deem prupp!'." PurSl1ant to this pro\'i-
!lion se{'tion 37 of tlle A I('oholi{' Bl'w!'Hg-e COlltrol Ac'.t as 
t>naet{'d ill 1935 gave I~it iI'''. \'olllltit>s, and {'itll's lind conntips 
50 per ('cnt of the licensl' fPI-S (·olll:'ctNl. (Stats. 193:;, p. 11:!:1, 
1142; 2 Deering's Ge11. Lows. Act 3796.) TJuder the 1!147 
amendment to this st>ct.ion all the reVt'lIue from !l1I(-h fl'es is 
distributed to thp cities, counties, and cities and count ies of 
the state. (Stats. 1947, p. 1766.) If this revenue is not aue-
/ 
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quate or commensurate with the value of the licenses, the 
remedy lies in tIle augmentation thereof by the Legislature 
pursuant to the power vested in it, not in the imposition by 
the local subdivisions of the state of an additional tax on 
the privileges for which the license fees are paid. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gib.c;on, C. J., Schauer, J ., and Spence, J., concurre4. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-The conclusion in this case is 
neither required nor justified by the law of this state. It is 
contrary to the constitutional mandate that all property 
be taxed except such as is specifically exempt from taxation. 
Here there is no exemption of this and like property rights, 
enormous in "alue in the aggregate, except the exemption by 
judicial fiat. 
It is the fact of which t.here is no denial that a liquor 
licem;e issued pursuant to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act 
is a valuable property right, owned privately as property is 
owned although subject to appropriate regulatory provisions 
in the exercise of the police power, is transferable for a cash 
consideration and therefore has an ascertainable valuation, 
is subject to I('vy of execution for the benefit of creditors, 
and may b~collle an item of property in the estate of a deceased 
hold('r. Thl' llJajority nevertheless conclude that this valuable 
prllpert~· right is not within the category of ad valorem taxa-
tion. because, 1'10 it is stated, only the intangibles specified in 
s('ction III of the Revenue and Taxation Code are to be 
rt'garded as personal property for purposes of taxation. 1'he 
conclusion is conceived by implication from a stat.utory 
C\('finition in tnrl1 based On a conceded implication from eOIl-
stitutional pro\'h,iollS. and the brrath of life attempted to 
lll' given thr f'x(>mptioll by the 8tatl'ment of a policy of ex-
p('(lit'ne~' or prn(·tieality ",hidl ral1l1ot be invoked to enlarge 
stHtutory provisions for exemption. 
The lI1aj()rit~· opinion allnc]rs only in passing to section 1, 
arti(')(' XII I. of the Rtate Constitution which provides: "All 
propt'l't,." in t hr 81 ate l'xc'rpt as oth('rwise in this Constitution 
pro\·irl;d. not exelllpt uJI(lrr t)w laws of the Unjl~d Statl's, 
~hllll hI' hlxl'tl in PI'opol'tioll to its Vllhlf'. to hi' as('rrtllinl'(\ 
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• propcrty,' as used in this article and section, is hereby 
dcclared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, fran-
chisl.'S, and all other matters and things, real, personal, and 
mixed, capable of private ownership . . ." 
The subsequent provision in section 14 of article XU 1 
quoted in the opinion, as granting power to provide for the 
assessment, levy and collection of taxes upon all forms of 
tangible personal property, all notes, debentures, liliares of 
capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, mortgages 
not exempt from taxation, in the absence of express limitation 
should not be read to exclude the existing constitutional 
power to tax items not listed, inasmuch as the obvious purpose 
of so enumerating the specific items was to place thereon the 
limitation as to the amount of tax appearing in the paragraph 
following. That this is so also appcars from the language in 
the latter paragraph following the specified limitation reading 
"and no tax burden shall be imposed upon any personal 
property either tangible or intangible which shall exceed the 
tax burden on real property in the same taxing jurisdiction 
in proportion to the actual value of such property." Far 
from being the clear implication stated by the majority. 
there is here no implication at all that the taxing power on 
intangibles was limited t.o the specified it.ems. The limitation 
in respect to those items was only as to the amount of t.he 
tax. The inclusion of items for the purpose of that limitation 
furnishes no reason for implying the exclusion of unspecified 
intangible property from the taxing power. There is therefore 
no limitation of the taxing power to the specified items b~' 
implication or otherwise. The statement that there is no grant 
of power to provide for taxation of intangible items other 
than those listed is beside the point and an erroneous basis for 
the conclusion, since the Constitution is deemed not to be 
a grant of power but a restriction upon the powers of the 
Legislature (People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46, 49-50 [60 Am.Dec. 
581]). As noted the fundamental law demands the exercise of 
the power to tax all property tangible or intangible capable of 
private ownership, not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, and the express limitation of the amount of the tax 
on specified items is not a contradiction thereof. 
The Legislature has the power to provide for exemptions, 
but such exemptions must be expres!';. They ,viII not be inferred 
or implied. The majority read definitions of "Intangibles" 
and "Intangible Personal Property" contained in section 
J 
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111 as an intention to include as exempt uuder section 212 
an item of property not mentioned therein. Section 111 is 
contained in a chapter (§ § 101-128) entitled "Construction." 
Section 101 provides: "Unless the context otherwise requires, 
the general provisions hereinafter set forth govern the con-
struction of this division. " (Div. 1, Property Taxation, §§ 101-
5143.) Section 103 reads: " 'Property' includes all matters 
and things, real, personal, and mind, capable of private 
ownership." This is the all-inclusive definition of the Con-
stitution. Section 106 provides: '" Personal property' in-
cludes all property except real estate." Section 111: " 'In-
tangibles' means intangible pt'rsonal property of a type not 
exempt from taxation and any interest therein. 'Intangible 
personal property' means only notes, debentures, shares of 
capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, and 
mortgages. " The purpose of statutory definitions is to indicate 
the meaning to be ascribed to certain words when used in the 
statute. The definition was desirable in order to fol1ow the 
constitutional mandate regarding the limitation on the taxing 
power of specified intangiblt' items. Therefore the word "in-
tangibles" as so defined means only the specified items when 
that word is used in the code. Section 201 which begins article 
1 (Ch.1, pt. 2, §§ 201-213), entitled,"Taxable lind Exempt 
Property," provides that all property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States or of this state, is subject 
to taxation lmder this code. This is a restatement of the consti-
tutional provision in section 1, article XIII. Section 212 reads : 
"Notes, debentures, shares of capital stock. bonds, deeds of 
trust, mortgages, and any interest in such property are exempt 
from taxation." 
The lack of relationship between section 111 dt'fining "In-
tangibles" and section 212 enumerating exempt items must 
be olJviuus. But the majority purport to vitalize the unrelated 
condusion by seeking support in considerations of policy 
which may underlie distinctions in personal property taxa-
tion due t.o a tendency to conceal intangible assets or minimize 
the value thereof for the purpose of avoiding high taxes. Such 
distinctions, if any are to bE' made. are of legislative cog-
nizan~f'. {n the abRE'neE' of h'giRlativp ilirect.ion, the problem 
becomes onE' primarily for th(· local assessmE'nt. authorities in 
determining whether a sprcified class of intangiblE' property 
not ('xl'mpt bas 8 suffit'iellt 8RcE'rtainable valuation to be 
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jority appears to be of the opinion that there is an evil whic11 
requires a remedy. If that be so, then it is also a matter of 
legislative rather than judicial responsibility. But the factual 
situation indicates that the Legislature is not greatly COll-
cerned in granting such an exemption. After the trial court 
entered judgment in thi., case (Jan. 3, 1947) upholding the 
tax, and during the 1947 session of the Legislature, the 
interests favoring exemption from ad valorem taxation of 
liquor licenses sought an amendment of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code to that effect (Assembly Bill No. 1839). The 
bill failed of passage, and the proper assumption is that the 
Legislature was satisfied that the exercise of authority by the 
local taxing officials in the present case was in accord with 
the Constitution and the statute and that an exemption was 
undesirable. 
It also follows from the foregoing that the "in lieu" 
(income) tax discussed by the majority applies only to the 
items specified in section 3627a, Political Code, as amended, 
namely, notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, bonds, deeds 
of trust, mortgages and any legal or equitable interest therein. 
These are the same items exempted by section 212 of the 
Revenue and Taxation Code. To say that it is absurd to include 
in ad valorem taxation valuable intangible assets not specifi-
cally exempt, and particularly the valuable asset here sought 
to be taxed, will come as a comforting surprise to those 
abundantly able to bear their just share of the burden of 
taxation. 
The majority opinion implicitly concedes that the tax 
involved, since it has strictly a revenue raising purpose as 
distinct from one that is regulatory or restrictive, is not an 
occupational tax or license fee the imposition and collection 
of which is reposed exclusively in the State Board of Equaliza-
tion (Const., art. XX, § 22) with provision for apportionment 
thereof among local governmental bodies. (See Los Angeles v. 
Los Angeles etc. Co., 152 Cal. 765 [93 P. 1006] ; Ingels v. Riley, 
5 Ca1.2d 154 [53 P.2d 939, 103 A.L.R. 1] ; Flynn v. San Fran-
cisco, 18 Ca1.2d 210, 215 [115 P.2d 3], citing Dawson v. Ken-
tucky Distille1'ies & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288, 292 [41 S.Ot. 
272, 65 L.Ed. 638].) Occupational taxes and license fees, 
therefore, are not involved in the problem, nor are they af-
fected by a decision in this case. 
Certainl.'· the Anderson cast> (San Franc;s()O v. Anderson, 
103 Oal. 69 [36 P. 1034, 42 Am.St.Hep. 98]) decided in 1894, 
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holding that the ownership of a seat on the stock exchange 
was a personal privi](>ge and the value thereof too uncertain 
to be included in any category of taxable property, should 
not here be aceorded any controlling effect. The force of 
the decision ill that case has vanished in view of the great 
weight of authority to the contrary since that time. Such 
privileges, inasmuch as they have large ascertainable market 
values, are now held to be property subject to ad valorem 
taxation unless expressly specified to be exempt. (See Citizens 
National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99, 108 [42 S.Ct. 15,66 L.Ed. 
149] ; In the Matter of Hellman, 174 N.Y. 254 (66 N.E. 809, 
95 Am.St.Rep. 582] ; State v. McPhail, 124 Minn. 398 [145 
N.W. 108, Ann.Cas. 1915C 538, 50 L.R.A.N.S. 255], referring 
to the "personal privilege" basis of California and Pennsyl. 
vania cases as unsound; 61 C.J. § 179, p. 203; 51 Am.Jur. § 421, 
p. 442 and additional cases cited note 11.) 
In my opinion our constitutional and statutory provisions 
require a conclusion that the ad valorem tax on the property 
here involved should be upheld. and that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied August 
26, 1948. Carter, J., and Shenk, J., voted for a rehearing. 
